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1PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS OF SMALLER UK REGIONAL AIRPORTS
INTRODUCTION
Smaller regional airports in the UK have experienced some major changes in their operating 
environment over the last 10-15 years. Some witnessed significant traffic growth from low 
cost carriers (LCCs) in the early years of this period, only to find that external factors such as 
increased rates of Air Passenger Duty (APD) and the economic recession, combined with the 
dynamic and evolving strategies of LCCs and other carriers, caused this traffic volume to fall 
dramatically or disappear entirely. As a result some airports have been closed (e.g. Plymouth 
and Manston) or are in a very difficult financial situation, or have changed owners. Some 
however have fared much better.
Meanwhile, government help to smaller airports is under the spotlight, not only with the 2014 
EU guidelines on state aid to smaller airports – generally those serving 1-5 million 
passengers per annum (mppa), but also with the decision of the UK government to award 
start-up aid to airlines at smaller regional airports through its Regional Air Connectivity Fund 
that views the airports as being vital engines for local economies.
The aim of this paper is to investigate traffic trends and the financial performance of smaller 
UK regional airports, and over a sufficiently long period of time, which in the case of this 
paper, is a fourteen year period from 2001 to 2014. Strong and weak performing airports are 
identified, and general trends are observed, which enables an assessment to be made of the 
future prospects for such airports.
The following section provides background to this paper with a review of literature on the 
general financial characteristics of smaller airports, the European Commission´s (EC) view of 
smaller airports, and the focus of this paper. Subsequent sections introduce the sample 
airports and data sources used, provide a discussion of the findings, and conclude by 
considering future prospects for the airports. 
BACKGROUND
General financial characteristics of smaller airports
Generally the airport industry experiences relatively high profit margins. In 2014, the top 100 
airports by revenue recorded an average operating margin of 26.5%. Since the turn of the 
century the lowest average margin was 14%, even though this was at the height of the global 
recession that severely depressed traffic volumes.1 Meanwhile the airline industry has often 
struggled to make an overall positive return in difficult years and it only recorded an 
operating margin of 5.5% in 2014 when there was a more favourable operating environment.2 
These contrasting profit levels for the airport and airline industry reflect their different cost 
and revenue structures, and arguably the less competitive environment for airports, together 
with reduced financial and business risks and the lower cost of capital.3
However different evidence exists for smaller airports. The average net profit margin for over 
600 airports worldwide was 15.9% in 2013 while it was -11.9% for airports with less than 1 
mppa. In addition, 93% of the net losses at airports worldwide were recorded at airports with 
less than 1 mppa. Over 98% of all losses were experienced at airports with less than 5 mppa.4
2A major reason for the poor performance of smaller airports is that most have insufficient 
traffic to drive down costs and achieve economies of scale. Irrespective of traffic volume, 
fixed costs related to large infrastructure such as runways and terminals, and certain 
operating costs (e.g. related to aspects of security and safety) need to be covered. These fixed 
costs can represent 70-90% of total costs.5 This means that costs per passenger, or unit costs, 
will be large when passenger numbers are low, but will decline if traffic increases, since the 
largely unchanged costs will be shared between more passengers. In 2013, average operating 
cost for airports (excluding depreciation) per passenger for airports worldwide was 
US$10.55. It was US$14.04 for airports with less than 1 mppa.6 This less favourable situation 
for smaller airports has been confirmed by research which has looked at economies of scale 
or returns to scale at airports.7-16 Other research has found that major airports are more 
efficient than regional ones.17,18
In terms of revenue generation, smaller airports are also likely to perform less well. In 2013, 
average unit revenues for airports worldwide was US$20.02 compared with US$14.32 for 
airports with less than 1 mppa. This is due to lower non-aeronautical revenues, which is 
partly a consequence of it not being financially viable for smaller airports to offer a full range 
of commercial services. The average retail revenue per square metre was US$0.61 for 
airports with less than 1 mppa, US$5.31 for airports with 1-5 million, US$10-20 for airports 
with 5-25 million, and over US$30 for airports with more than 30 mppa.19
On the aeronautical side, the larger unit costs at smaller airports would suggest that higher 
airport charges should be levied. However, the greater competitive forces that smaller 
airports often face, combined with the fact that the airlines serving such airports may be low 
cost or regional carriers that are more sensitive to the level of airport charges, means that this 
may not be the case. Moreover, many small airports tend to be dominated by just a couple of 
carriers, which may increase the airline bargaining power when charges are set. Indeed, 
aeronautical revenues per passenger for airports with less than 1 mppa were US$9.99 in 
2013, and US$10.73 for airports with 1-5 million, which was not far from the average for 
airports worldwide of US$11.88.20
Whilst evidence indicates that airport size plays an important role in influencing financial 
performance, there are other factors related to small airports, which may add to the inherent 
disadvantages directly associated with size meaning that the nature, as well as the volume of 
traffic needs to be considered. At large airports, international passengers tend to dominate 
and this can increase costs compared with domestic passengers because of longer dwell 
times, extra luggage and the need for more services such as customs and border control. 
However, overall these increased costs are often more than compensated for by better 
revenue performance, particularly in the non-aeronautical area. Some studies have confirmed 
that higher shares of international traffic have a positive influence on overall economic or 
financial performance and so smaller airports handling mainly domestic traffic may not 
perform so well.21 Meanwhile, smaller airports serving holiday destinations may have a 
problem with seasonality and uneven capacity utilization, which can push up costs and 
reduce efficiency.22,23
LCCs tend to be the dominant airlines at many smaller airports. This may reduce costs 
because of the simpler facilities that these airlines want, which in turn may lower the 
aeronautical revenues, especially if such carriers have been forceful in negotiating a 
favourable deal concerning airport charges. However, there is conflicting evidence as to 
3whether the presence of LCC passengers has a favourable24 or detrimental25 impact on non-
aeronautical revenues. Recent research found that over 70% of airports report that LCC 
passengers spend less than other passengers on retail and over 45% report less spend on food 
and beverage.26
Another key factor is ownership and governance, and notably whether the airport has been 
privatised. Whilst existing evidence is contradictory or inconclusive, nevertheless a number 
of studies have found that privatised airports have better economic or financial 
performance.27-29 This may be relevant for smaller airports as generally they have 
experienced less privatisation than larger airports. This is exemplified by the fact that in 
2016, whilst 59% of airports in Europe were still in public ownership, they only accounted 
for 26% of the total passenger traffic.30  
The EC’s view of smaller airports
Many assumptions about the general financial characteristics of smaller airports seem to hold 
true for the European situation. In 2013, 14% of airports with 3-5 mppa were loss making in 
terms of both operating and net profit. The corresponding shares for airports with 1-3 million 
were 16% and 35% respectively but for those with less than 1 million it was 79% and 77%.31
The view of the EC is that European airports with more than 5 mppa should usually be 
profitable and able to cover all of their costs, whilst those with 3-5 million should be able to 
cover a large proportion of their costs.32 Below 3 million, the EC separately considers the 
operating and capital costs and argues that for airports with 1-3 mppa, the majority of 
operating costs but only a partial amount of capital costs should be covered. Between 
200,000 to 1 mppa, airports should only be able to partially cover the operating and capital 
costs. The most challenging situation is for airports with less than 200,000 passengers, which 
may not be able to cover both their operating and capital costs. 
As a result of this situation many state owned smaller airports in the EU have relied on the 
use of public funds and subsidies to cover operating losses and/or to attract price-sensitive 
airlines such as LCCs, with price incentives, marketing support or long-term contracts with 
differentiated tariffs. This has been of growing concern to the EC who fears that this can 
produce a duplication of airports in the same catchment area and potentially create an over-
capacity situation where traffic is split between a number of underutilised airports.
Consequently, new guidelines on state aid to airports were introduced in 2014.33 These take 
into account the EC’s current view on how small airports can cover both their operating and 
capital costs. For operating aid, the guidelines offer a transition period of ten years for 
airports with less than 3 mppa, during which a maximum of 50-80% of the funding gap (i.e. 
the difference between costs and revenues) can be covered by aid. After this the airports need 
to cover their own costs and be profitable (although the situation for airports with less than 
700,000 passengers will be assessed again after four years). The transition period is designed 
to provide small airports with enough time to adjust to new market developments and to 
improve their financial performance, for example by differentiating their business models, 
attracting new customers, by introducing rationalisation measures, by raising airport charges 
and diversifying their revenue sources. As regards capital aid, there are new rules linked to 
airport size with the maximum being 75% for airports with less than 1 mppa, 50% for airports 
with 1-3 million, and 25% for airports with 3-5 million. There are some exceptions for 
airports in remote and peripheral regions. 
4According to the EC’s impact assessment, the new guidelines will not mean that any airport 
of over half a million passengers will close, but smaller ones could do if they cannot improve 
their financial performance.34
The focus of this paper 
Having considered the general financial characteristics of smaller airports and the EC’s view 
related to this, this section now links this to the UK situation, which is the focus of this paper.
Firstly, in line with the general case there is some evidence to suggest that small airports 
within the UK have weaker financial performance or efficiency levels,35-39 although 
contradictory or inconclusive research exists as regards the size relationship.40,41  Secondly, 
there has been some research regarding the impact of LCCs and other types of traffic on regional 
airports in the UK. Full service and charter carriers have been found to provide a higher contribution 
to aeronautical and commercial revenues compared to LCCs.42 Similarly, LCCs have been found to 
generate an average of £2.78 per passenger in commercial revenues compared to £5.59 for other 
carriers,43 while smaller and regional UK airports with a higher share of LCCs tended to have lower 
unit revenues.44 More generally for all UK airports, it has been found that most airports dominated by 
LCCs experienced below average growth in operating profit,45 while LCC passengers impose 
significantly lower costs at UK airports.46 
Finally, as regards ownership, the limited research that exists relates to all UK airports, not 
just the smaller ones. This evidence is rather inconclusive with some studies arguing that 
privatised UK airports perform better compared to public or mixed ownership ones,47,48 
whilst others found no such relationship.49,50 In relation to the EC state aid guidelines it is 
important to note that the UK has a much higher proportion of privatised small airports than 
in most other countries, making these guidelines somewhat less relevant. Nevertheless the 
issue of subsidies for smaller airports in the UK has still received attention and challenges the 
EC’s view by arguing that both small and large airports can be profitable.51
In light of the situation regarding research on UK airports but also the more general 
discussion, this study aims to investigate traffic developments at the UK´s smaller regional 
airports, and how changes in the nature of traffic may be affecting their performance. The 
study then investigates airport financial performance in terms of operating and net profit 
margins, and whether there is a relationship between traffic volume and the revenues and 
costs that are generated by airports. Traffic and financial performance according to airport 
ownership is also taken into consideration. 
AIRPORTS AND DATA
This study focuses on the UK´s smaller regional airports that generally serve between 
100,000 to less than 5 mppa (Table 1). This does not include the six London airports 
(Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, Luton, London City and Southend) or the five larger regional 
airports serving more than 5 mppa (Manchester, Edinburgh, Birmingham, Bristol and 
Glasgow).
From the 25 airports listed in Table 1, 14 are included in this study (and vary in size from 
Newcastle with 4.5 million passengers in 2014 to Durham Tees Valley with 142 000). 
Remaining airports were excluded due to a lack of availability of financial data. 
5Table 1 UK regional airports serving 100,000 to 5 million passengers in 2014.
> 3 to 5 million > 1 to 3 million > 700,000 to 1 million 100,000 to 700,000
✓East Midlands
✓Newcastle
✓Belfast International
✓Liverpool
✓Aberdeen
✓Leeds Bradford
Belfast City
✓Southampton
✓Cardiff
Prestwick
✓Doncaster
✓Exeter
✓Bournemouth
Inverness
Norwich
City of Derry
Scatsta
Sumburgh
Stornoway
✓Humberside
✓Blackpool
Newquay
Kirkwall
✓Durham Tees Valley
Stornoway
Source: UK CAA (2014).
✓= Included in this study.
By 2015, half of the airports were under total private ownership and the rest had at least some 
private involvement (Table 2). The only exception is Cardiff, which having been under total 
private ownership from 2001 to 2012, was bought by the Welsh government in 2013. By 
contrast, around half of the airports were still under total public local council ownership in 
2001. There have also been a number of changes in the actual owners and there are now four 
groups that own or operate more than one regional airport, namely AGS, MAG, the Peel 
Group and the Rigby Group. 
Table 2 Ownership of selected airports.
Airport Ownership in 2015
Private 
interest 
2015 (%)
Private 
interest 
2001 (%) Ownership changes since 2001 
East Midlands MAG 35.5 0 2013: IFM bought 35.5% of MAG
Newcastle Local government 
(51%) AMP Capital 
(49%)
49 49 2001: 49% bought by Copenhagen 
airport from local government
2012: Private interest bought by AMP 
Capital
Belfast International Airports Worldwide 100 100 2005: TBI owners bought by ACDL 
(90% Abertis/10% AENA ownership) 
2013: Airport bought by Airports 
Worldwide
Liverpool Peel Group 100 100
Aberdeen AGS 100 100 2006: BAA owners bought by 
Ferrovial
2014: Airport bought by AGS 
(Ferrovial/Macquarie partnership)
Leeds Bradford Bridgepoint 100 0 2007: Bridgepoint bought airport from 
local government
Southampton AGS 100 100 2006: BAA owners bought by 
Ferrovial
2014: Airport bought by AGS
Cardiff Welsh Government 0 100 2013: Bought by Welsh government 
from ACDL 
Doncaster Peel Group 100 n/a 2005: Opened by owners Peel Group
Exeter Rigby Group 100 0 2007: Airport bought by Balfour 
Beatty from local government
2013: Airport bought by Rigby Group
Bournemouth MAG 35.5 0 2013: IFM bought 35.5% of MAG
Humberside Eastern Group 82.7 0 2012: Eastern Group bought 82.7% 
6share from MAG
Blackpool Balfour Beatty 
(with Rigby Group 
management 
contract)
95 0 2004: MAR Properties bought 95% 
from local government  
2008: Private interest bought by 
Balfour Beatty
Durham Tees Valley Peel Group 89 0 2003: 75% bought by Peel Group 
from local government  
2012: Local government share 
reduced to 11%. 
Source: Compiled by the authors from various sources.
Passenger traffic data for individual airports was extracted from the UK CAA website. Data 
includes total terminal passengers, and the split between domestic and international, and 
scheduled and charter. Airport financial data was extracted from the Centre for the Study of 
Regulated Industries report ‘UK Performance Indicators’ by LeighFisher. Data includes total 
revenues (and the split between aeronautical and commercial revenues), total operating costs, 
and operating and net profit. Financial data was available for financial years 2001/2 to 
2014/15 (referred to as 2001 to 2014 in this paper). The start and end of financial years varies 
by airport and occasionally changes over time. Monthly traffic data is therefore used to fit in 
with the exact start and end of each financial year for individual airports.
Schedules data was extracted from the Innovata Flight Schedules Database that contains 
airline schedules according to points served, aircraft type and seat capacity, flight frequency, 
and available seat kilometres. The data includes almost every operating scheduled airline in 
the world, and also includes schedules for many leisure carriers. This study uses one-way 
schedules data from selected airports from 2002 to 2014. Flightglobal classifies passenger 
airlines worldwide according to five main types - mainline, low cost, regional, leisure and 
ACMI (wet lease). The Flightglobal classification was used to distinguish between the five 
types of carrier in this study.
FINDINGS
Traffic developments
Figure 1 shows a number of key traffic developments at selected airports. Passenger numbers 
grew from 2001 to 2007 with average annual growth of 14.3%. There were then a few years 
of decline to 2010 before growth stagnated up to 2014. Average annual growth from 2007 to 
2014 was -2.8%. All of the airports experienced growth from 2001 to 2007 (Table 3). Only 
two of them (Aberdeen and Leeds Bradford) experienced growth from 2007 to 2014.
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Figure 1 Traffic developments at selected airports, 2001 to 2014.
Table 3 Passengers at selected airports for key periods.
Passengers (000) Average annual change (%)
Airport 2001 2007 2014 2001-2007 2007-2014 2001-2014
East Midlands 2380 5407 4507 21.2 -2.4 6.9
Newcastle 3376 5624 4513 11.1 -2.8 2.6
Belfast International 3603 5236 4032 7.6 -3.3 0.9
Liverpool 2251 5463 3984 23.8 -3.9 5.9
Aberdeen 2525 3411 3723 5.8 1.3 3.6
Leeds Bradford 1524 2860 3263 14.6 2.0 8.8
Southampton 857 1965 1830 21.5 -1.0 8.7
Cardiff 1524 2094 1020 6.2 -7.3 -2.5
Doncaster n/a 1074 724 39.4* -4.7 1.9*
Exeter 333 1012 767 34.0 -3.5 10.0
Bournemouth 265 1083 660 51.4 -5.6 11.5
Humberside 435 466 237 1.2 -7.0 -3.5
Blackpool 81 558 224 98.1 -8.6 13.6
Durham Tees Valley 730 735 142 0.1 -11.5 -6.2
Total 19884 36988 29626 14.3 -2.8 3.8
* Doncaster from 2005 (no passengers from 2001 to 2004).
The decline and subsequent stagnation in traffic growth is likely to have been caused by a 
number of factors. From February 2007, the UK´s APD (an excise duty introduced in 1994 
and charged on the carriage of passengers flying from UK airports) was doubled from rates of 
£5-£40 (depending on the destination and class of travel) to £10-£80. Rates have continued to 
increase most years since 2007. By 2014, rates varied from £13-£188 (depending on distance 
flown and class of travel). In addition, fuel prices peaked during 2008/9 and remained 
relatively high throughout the first half of the 2010´s. Airlines therefore struggled to offer the 
low fares that stimulated demand up to 2007, and at a time when outbound business and 
leisure demand was depressed as a result of the financial crisis of 2007/8, the subsequent 
recession, and the weak pound. There were also one-off shock events such as the eruption of 
Eyjafjallajökull in Iceland in 2010 that resulted in the closure of large parts of European 
airspace for a number of weeks. Airports have also been under pressure themselves from 
increased security measures that have had a major impact on their costs.
8Two main changes in the composition of passenger demand have also occurred (Figure 1 and 
Table 4). Firstly, the share of domestic passengers has declined from 37 to 31%. It has 
declined at all airports except for Cardiff, Exeter and Durham Tees Valley. The decline may 
be a result of APD being much higher on domestic routes as it is effectively charged twice for 
a return trip (once from each departing airport). With more stringent security measures, 
domestic air travel has also arguably become more cumbersome than rail travel. Domestic 
passengers may therefore have switched to alternative modes of transport where possible. 
The decline flattened out a little in later years. 
Secondly, the share of charter passengers has declined from 39 to 16%. Dramatic reductions 
were experienced at all airports, except for Doncaster. The decline reflects changes taking 
place in the outbound leisure market from the UK where passengers have been shifting from 
the traditional package holiday to more independent and flexible travel arrangements offered 
for instance by LCCs, including short break holidays.
Table 4 Proportion of domestic and charter passengers at selected airports for key periods.
Domestic passengers (%) Charter passengers (%)
Airport 2001 2007 2014
Change 
2001-2014 2001 2007 2014
Change 
2001-2014
East Midlands 13.9 12.9 9.0 -4.9 67.9 28.4 18.2 -49.7
Newcastle 30.3 29.8 26.1 -4.2 46.6 29.6 20.6 -26.0
Belfast International 72.6 65.8 67.1 -5.5 20.5 12.9 6.7 -13.8
Liverpool 31.4 15.1 19.9 -11.5 9.8 4.9 0.4 -9.4
Aberdeen 65.8 56.7 56.8 -9.0 26.5 21.8 24.1 -2.4
Leeds Bradford 28.9 22.1 11.3 -17.6 42.1 11.0 3.6 -38.5
Southampton 72.1 61.0 63.4 -8.7 6.3 0.5 0.5 -5.8
Cardiff 7.4 20.4 15.7 8.3 67.7 46.2 51.6 -16.1
Doncaster 7.2* 9.8 1.4 -5.8* 25.6* 27.7 55.4 29.8*
Exeter 30.9 39.6 39.5 8.6 64.0 26.5 30.4 -33.6
Bournemouth 1.9 10.3 0.2 -1.7 66.8 14.7 27.7 -39.1
Humberside 8.0 7.5 6.3 -1.7 63.4 63.5 30.0 -33.4
Blackpool 24.7 21.5 6.7 -18.0 76.5 4.5 8.9 -67.6
Durham Tees Valley 25.2 17.6 26.8 1.6 54.5 31.0 2.1 -52.4
Total 37.0 31.7 31.3 -5.7 38.6 20.7 16.4 -22.2
* Doncaster from 2005 (no passengers from 2001 to 2004)
In addition to being influenced by factors mentioned previously, changes in passenger 
demand are influencing and/or being influenced by changes in airline strategy. Leisure 
carriers are increasingly replacing charter with scheduled services, which has artificially 
reduced the proportion of charter passengers in Figure 1 and means that the proportion of 
scheduled capacity offered by leisure carriers from selected airports has increased (Figure 2 
and Table 5).
Moreover, much of the early growth was from LCCs (Figure 2). The proportion of LCC seats 
peaked at 68% in 2008 (having increased each year from 42% in 2002). Since 2008, it has 
declined each year to 53% by 2014. Some of the larger airports have experienced significant 
reductions in the seat share of LCCs since 2007 such as East Midlands, Newcastle and 
Cardiff (Table 5). At Cardiff and East Midlands the demise of bmibaby lies behind the 
reduction in LCC services while at Newcastle it is easyJet that has dramatically reduced 
services. The share of regional carriers has increased from 14% in 2002 to 20% in 2014 while 
the share of mainline seat capacity has fallen dramatically from 42% to 14%, largely as a 
result of BMI, which provided 12% of the seat capacity in 2002 being integrated into British 
9Airways by 2012. British Airways themselves have reduced capacity at the airports from 
26% in 2002 to 5% in 2014. Much of their capacity appears to be shifting to larger regional 
and London airports, especially the latter where they have precious slots available for more 
lucrative long-haul services.
Table 5 also shows that airports in the 3-5 mppa category are dominated by LCC capacity, 
except for Aberdeen where regional carriers including BMI Regional, Eastern Airways and 
Flybe, which all have bases at the airport, have increased the regional share of seat capacity. 
The airport also serves helicopter operations for the Scottish offshore oil industry. At 
remaining airports, the mix of traffic varies significantly. Many of the smaller airports, that 
are often dependent on just one or a few carriers, have experienced a fair amount of 
turbulence in recent years that is not shown in the limited data provided in Table 5. For 
instance, mainline carrier SAS started a service to Copenhagen from Humberside in 2013 but 
withdrew the route in 2014 due to weak demand. Leisure carrier Thomson Airways operated 
a number of routes to Spain from Durham Tees Valley during 2012 and 2013 but withdrew 
them by 2014 as a result of a disagreement with the airport operator. Blackpool was served 
by Citywing to Belfast via the Isle of Man and Aer Lingus to Dublin while its largest operator 
was Jet2.com serving ten destinations. All services were terminated when the airport initially 
closed in October 2014 (with Jet2.com switching its services to Manchester) following years 
of financial struggles for the airport operator. The airport reopened in April 2015, served by 
Citywing´s service to Belfast via the Isle of Man.
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Figure 2 Share of scheduled seat capacity at selected airports, 2002 to 2014.
Note: ACMI not shown (generally very low proportion of between 0 to 0.4%).
Table 5 Proportion of seats available by type of carrier for key periods.
Airport Carrier 2002 2007 2014 Airport Carrier 2002 2007 2014
Leisure 0.1 13.8 28.7 Cardiff Leisure 9.9 33.5 41.5
Low-cost 60.2 83.9 58.4 Low-cost 28.4 42.0 18.8
Mainline 37.9 1.4 - Mainline 56.8 10.0 15.9
East 
Midlands
Regional 1.8 0.8 12.9 Regional 5.0 14.6 23.9
Newcastle Leisure 5.0 11.4 19.1 Doncaster Leisure - 67.0 51.3
Low-cost 9.6 55.9 43.3 Low-cost - 26.8 46.1
10
Mainline 63.4 21.7 28.6 Mainline - - -
Regional 22.0 11.0 9.0 Regional - 6.2 0.5
Leisure 1.2 6.0 6.5 Exeter Leisure - 10.2 22.3
Low-cost 82.4 91.8 91.3 Low-cost - 0.8 -
Mainline 16.4 1.9 2.0 Mainline - - 1.0
Belfast 
International
Regional - 0.3 - Regional 100 89.0 76.7
Liverpool Leisure - 0.2 - Bournemouth Leisure - 49.9 23.6
Low-cost 90.3 96.3 96.8 Low-cost 100 45.3 76.4
Mainline 2.7 0.1 - Mainline - 3.2 -
Regional 7.0 3.4 3.1 Regional - 1.6 -
Aberdeen Leisure - 1.1 0.5 Humberside Leisure - 16.2 2.1
Low-cost 8.0 14.6 8.4 Low-cost - - -
Mainline 73.6 60.5 53.4 Mainline - 63.0 70.6
Regional 18.2 23.8 37.7 Regional 100 20.8 27.4
Leisure - 3.8 11.5 Blackpool Leisure - 13.0 -
Low-cost 12.2 59.6 67.9 Low-cost - 83.6 89.3
Mainline 63.5 19.7 12.3 Mainline - - -
Leeds 
Bradford
Regional 24.3 16.9 8.4 Regional 100 3.4 10.7
Southampton Leisure - - - Durham Leisure - 1.9 -
Low-cost - - - Low-cost 18.1 43.9 -
Mainline 74.9 5.4 - Mainline 49.1 43.3 70.9
Regional 20.0 93.6 100 Regional 32.9 11.0 29.1
Note: ACMI not listed so where it does not equal 100%, the remainder is ACMI.
In recent years, many carriers, especially LCCs, have been investing in larger aircraft. For 
instance, Ryanair has phased out its smaller Boeing 737-200 aircraft for 189-seat Boeing 
737-800 aircraft. As of 2014, Ryanair´s principal fleet consisted of 297 Boeing 737-800 
aircraft and is expected to increase to 426 such aircraft by 2019. In addition, Ryanair has 
signed up for 200 Boeing 737 MAX 200 aircraft by 2029 with plans to seat 197 passengers 
on them. Of the main carriers operating from the selected airports since 2002, easyJet has 
increased its average seats per departure from 148 in 2002 to 160 in 2014, Ryanair from 122 
to 189, British Airways from 63 to 136, Flybe from 54 to 77, KLM UK from 55 to 108, and 
Eastern Airways from 21 to 33. Table 6 shows the impact that this has had on average aircraft 
capacity from the airports. Average sector length has also increased, as would be expected 
given the proportionate increase in international versus domestic traffic.
Table 6 Average capacity and sector length from selected airports for key periods.
2002 2007 2014
Airport
Seat 
capacity
Sector 
length (km)
Seat 
capacity
Sector 
length (km)
Seat 
capacity
Sector 
length (km)
East Midlands 94 788 158 1183 152 1683
Newcastle 84 558 122 1024 133 1562
Belfast International 136 395 151 850 159 888
Liverpool 127 753 157 1090 167 1082
Aberdeen 68 555 70 643 80 628
Leeds Bradford 57 358 104 865 137 1505
Southampton 46 372 66 503 72 475
Cardiff 58 709 122 1126 91 1357
Doncaster n/a n/a 190 1261 144 1876
Exeter 51 210 87 772 87 950
Bournemouth 141 542 167 1057 176 1729
Humberside 36 378 60 762 56 435
Blackpool 56 208 125 838 75 1659
Durham Tees Valley 69 377 79 858 55 430
Total 81 550 115 941 119 1199
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Increased average unit fleet size and faltering demand has resulted in routes being reduced or 
dropped altogether as carriers shift capacity from the smaller regional airports to larger 
regional and London airports that have greater potential for demand. There are also 
operational limits at some of the airports that restrict their ability to handle the larger aircraft 
and longer distances flown. These were amongst the challenges faced by Plymouth – a small 
regional airport that served as many as 160,000 passengers in 2009 before closing in 
December 2011. The catchment area of the airport overlapped with Exeter and Newquay, and 
with Bristol nearby. This is a problem for many of the airports in this study such as Liverpool 
and Blackpool (with Manchester nearby), Belfast International (with Belfast City and City of 
Derry nearby), Durham Tees Valley and Newcastle are located in fairly close proximity to 
each other, as are Humberside and Doncaster, and Southampton and Bournemouth. In 
addition, the runway at Plymouth has a maximum take-off distance of less than 1200 metres 
(and with little room for expansion), which significantly limits the size and type of aircraft 
that can operate from the airport.
Another problem for Plymouth, which is also an issue for many airports in this study, is that 
UK passenger traffic is increasingly concentrated at London airports, and at the expense of 
potential regional hub airports. A growing scarcity of take off and landing slots from London 
Heathrow and Gatwick has progressively shifted from UK domestic routes to long-haul 
routes meaning that access for smaller regional airports to London markets, and also to long-
haul gateway airports is increasingly limited. Of the airports in this study, only Newcastle 
(with British Airways), Aberdeen (with British Airways and Virgin Atlantic), and Leeds 
Bradford (with British Airways) had links to Heathrow in 2014. At Gatwick, it was just 
Newcastle (with easyJet and Flybe) and Aberdeen (with easyJet).
Financial performance
Average annual operating and net profit margins are shown in Figure 3. There are two 
distinct periods that coincide with the periods of traffic growth and decline that was seen in 
the previous section. There was a period of relative prosperity from 2001 to 2007 followed by 
a more challenging period from 2007 to 2014. Airports with larger traffic volumes have 
generally performed better (Table 7). The five largest airports achieved positive operating 
margins, on average, including during the challenging period from 2007 to 2014. Leeds 
Bradford is the only airport in the 3-5 million passenger category to have struggled, and the 
airport has recorded operating losses each year from 2007 to 2014. The 1-3 mppa airports 
(Southampton and Cardiff) have experienced mixed results, while airports with less than 1 
mppa have generally performed poorly during both periods. Some of them appear to be 
inherently loss making, especially Blackpool and Durham Tees Valley, which have recorded 
operating losses each year from 2001 to 2014. In addition, Doncaster only opened in 2005 
and has recorded operating losses in seven of the nine years since then.
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Figure 3 Average margins for selected airports, 2001 to 2014.
Table 7 Average airport operating and net profit margins at selected airports for key periods.
Operating margin (%) Net profit margin (%)
Airport 2001-2007 2007-2014 2001-2014 2001-2007 2007-2014 2001-2014
East Midlands 32.4 20.6 25.5 24.8 14.4 17.9
Newcastle 32.8 32.2 32.3 16.7 25.9 22.9
Belfast International 27.8 16.0 20.6 18.5 8.8 12.2
Liverpool 11.5 8.9 9.9 8.7 -8.0 -1.7
Aberdeen 34.3 25.7 29.2 26.4 19.5 21.8
Leeds Bradford 7.5 -18.9 -6.5 3.8 -28.1 -13.4
Southampton 30.7 -7.5 9.3 22.5 -0.6 8.4
Cardiff 34.9 3.8 17.3 26.1 7.1 14.8
Doncaster -42.0 -89.8 -80.1 -66.2 -132.1 -119.7
Exeter 7.1 1.7 4.7 18.0 -0.3 9.0
Bournemouth 17.9 12.2 14.4 15.2 -20.0 -5.4
Humberside 10.6 -0.8 4.5 -1.5 -6.2 -3.9
Blackpool -37.9 -40.0 -37.8 -16.3 -40.1 -24.5
Durham Tees Valley -15.1 -63.9 -42.5 -13.0 -47.7 -32.8
Total 13.9 -6.7 2.7 10.1 -14.3 -3.2
In terms of the link between ownership and financial performance, the findings are mixed. 
Four of the airports have remained 100% owned by private interests during the period from 
2001 to 2014 (Belfast International, Liverpool, Aberdeen, and Southampton). These airports 
have performed reasonably well during both key periods of traffic development. Cardiff was 
100% privately owned until the Welsh Government bought it from ACDL in 2013. Cardiff 
recorded an operating and net profit each year until 2012 but has recorded losses since then. 
Leeds Bradford and Exeter both changed from 100% local government to 100% private in 
2007. The airports have experienced mixed fortunes since then. Leeds Bradford has recorded 
operating and net profit losses each year while Exeter has generally remained positive most 
years. Doncaster was opened by its owner the Peel Group in 2005 and has recorded operating 
and net profit losses in seven of the nine financial years since then. Newcastle changed from 
100% local government ownership to 51% in 2001 and has remained 49% private since then 
even though the private share was transferred (from Copenhagen airport to AMP Capital in 
13
2012). Similarly, East Midlands was acquired by MAG in 2001 (and was therefore publicly 
owned but privately managed). Australian investment fund IFM bought 35.5% of MAG in 
2013. Along with privately owned Aberdeen, East Midlands and Newcastle are clearly the 
best financial performers of the airports in this study, and generally record healthy operating 
and net profits each year.
The four smallest airports in this study (Bournemouth, Humberside, Blackpool and Durham 
Tees Valley) were all 100% local government owned prior to 2001 but have since increased 
their share of private interests to varying degrees, and with mixed fortunes. Bournemouth and 
Humberside have generally performed satisfactorily while Blackpool and Durham Tees 
Valley are inherently loss making, recording losses every year since 2001.
Airport financial performance therefore seems to have less to do with ownership than the 
high fixed costs and insufficient levels of demand to drive down costs and achieve economies 
of scale, resulting in higher costs per passenger. Airports with the highest costs per passenger 
also generally achieve higher revenues per passenger (Figure 4 and 5) but the unit revenues 
for many of them remain below the level of unit costs, especially during the period from 2007 
to 2014 (Table 8).
It is also interesting to note the apparent relationship that traffic mix has with unit costs and 
revenues at individual airports. The airports in Figure 4 and 5 can be grouped in three main 
categories according to their main type(s) of carriers from Table 5: the smaller airports with 
higher unit costs and revenues (Durham Tees Valley, Humberside, Exeter and Southampton) 
are dominated by mainline and regional carriers; the smaller airports with lower unit costs 
and revenues (Bournemouth, Doncaster and Cardiff) are dominated by leisure and LCCs; the 
larger airports with lower unit costs and revenues (East Midlands, Newcastle, Belfast 
International, Liverpool, Aberdeen and Leeds Bradford) are dominated by LCCs with the 
exception of Aberdeen that is dominated by mainline and regional carriers.
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Figure 4 Total cost per passenger according to passengers, 2014.
Note: Missing data in 2014 for Blackpool.
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Figure 5 Total revenue per passenger according to passengers, 2014.
Note: Missing data in 2014 for Blackpool.
Table 8 Average unit costs and revenues at selected airports for key periods.
Unit cost Unit revenue
Airport 2001-2007 2007-2014 2001-2014 2001-2007 2007-2014 2001-2014
East Midlands 8.3 9.3 9.0 12.3 11.7 12.1
Newcastle 7.0 7.3 7.2 10.4 10.8 10.7
Belfast International 5.2 6.0 5.7 7.2 7.1 7.2
Liverpool 6.0 5.9 6.0 6.7 6.5 6.6
Aberdeen 7.4 11.9 10.0 11.3 15.9 13.9
Leeds Bradford 8.2 9.6 9.1 9.0 8.1 8.6
Southampton 9.8 15.9 13.3 13.9 14.7 14.5
Cardiff 8.1 12.5 10.7 12.5 12.7 12.7
Doncaster 12.1 19.2 18.4 9.2 11.5 11.5
Exeter 21.9 23.7 23.0 23.7 24.2 24.2
Bournemouth 18.5 16.1 17.7 22.1 18.5 20.6
Humberside 18.3 35.2 27.6 20.4 35.0 28.4
Blackpool 39.2 34.7 37.6 30.5 25.1 28.5
Durham Tees Valley 14.1 39.7 28.5 12.2 24.0 18.8
Total 13.2 17.7 16.0 14.4 16.1 15.6
Figure 6 and Table 9 show the proportion of revenue from aeronautical sources. Whilst these 
values reflect many factors, including the amount of outsourcing undertaken by the airports 
and the mix of traffic, they also demonstrate the importance of the aeronautical and 
commercial aspects of the business. From 2001 to 2007, there seems to be a clear trend with 
airports experiencing a reduction in the proportion of their aeronautical revenues, except for 
Southampton, Doncaster and Exeter. This may have been the result of increased passenger 
throughput (Figure 6) but also a greater emphasis on commercial activities, encouraged by a 
more business-like approach as a result of privatisation in the preceding years (Table 2), 
coupled with pressures from carriers to keep charges low as they rapidly expanded their 
services. This reduction in the proportion of aeronautical revenues continued to 2008 but 
flattened off to 2014. Whilst pressures on airport charges may have remained, falling 
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passenger throughput probably meant that commercial revenue generation became more 
challenging during this period.
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Figure 6 Average passengers and aeronautical revenues for selected airports, 2001-2014.
Table 9 Proportion of revenue from aeronautical sources at selected airports for key periods.
Average Average Average
Airport 2001-2007 2007-2014 2001-2014
East Midlands 58.6 47.2 52.6
Newcastle 60.4 48.1 54.1
Belfast International 52.0 45.1 48.4
Liverpool 49.6 36.1 43.9
Aberdeen 57.8 56.4 57.2
Leeds Bradford 57.4 36.8 43.7
Southampton 54.4 57.8 56.0
Cardiff 67.3 54.1 60.3
Doncaster 24.0* 34.1 32.0
Exeter 48.5 57.0 53.5
Bournemouth 35.8 32.9 34.6
Humberside 43.1 34.8 38.9
Blackpool 53.7 40.5 43.4
Durham Tees Valley 60.6 50.2 54.8
Total 53.1 44.7 48.6
* Doncaster taken from 2005 (no passengers from 2001 to 2004)
Through time if passenger numbers increase so should revenues, although not always in a 
straightforward manner since some revenue streams (e.g. landing charges and rents) may not 
be directly dependent on passenger throughput, and of course other factors such as the traffic 
mix and charging policies may change. Conversely, if numbers decrease revenues are likely 
to decline. As regards costs, airports generally have a high proportion of fixed costs and 
hence the link with passenger throughput is somewhat complex. Also a number of studies 
have found that economies of scale exist particularly for the smaller airports. Thus if traffic 
grows, depending on the size of the airport, costs may not necessarily rise. Also airport 
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investment is ‘lumpy’ and so costs will vary depending where the airport is positioned in the 
investment cycle.
The relationship between passenger throughput and revenues and costs is shown in Figure 7. 
The relationship between passengers and revenues is much stronger and more significant 
(correlation coefficient of .824, p .000) than the relationship between passengers and costs 
(.545, p .044). Although not shown in Figure 7, the relationship between passengers and the 
different types of revenues also varies. The relationship with commercial revenues is strong 
and significant (.782, p .001), while the relationship with aeronautical revenues is not 
significant (.202, p .489). Indeed, the average total amount of aeronautical revenue generated 
has remained fairly similar each year despite the increase and subsequent decrease and 
flattening out of passenger demand.
The findings for individual airports can be seen in Table 10. At the larger airports, there is 
generally a strong and significant relationship between passenger throughput and revenues. 
This includes with commercial revenues but not so much with aeronautical revenues. This 
may be due to downward pressure on aeronautical revenues in order to attract, grow and 
retain air services but also the ability of such airports to diversity and offer a full range of 
commercial facilities for their larger passenger volumes. There also appears to be a 
relationship between passenger throughput and costs at the larger airports suggesting that 
there are minimal economies of scale to be gained from increasing traffic at such airports.
The findings are less conclusive for smaller airports. There appears to be little relationship 
between passenger throughput and revenues, especially commercial revenues. This indicates 
the challenge faced by them in being able to offer a diverse and viable range of commercial 
facilities for their smaller passenger volumes. There also appears to be little relationship 
between passenger traffic and operating costs, which suggests that, unlike for the larger 
airports in this study, there are economies of scale to be gained from increasing traffic at the 
smaller airports.
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Figure 7 Average passengers, cost and revenues at sample airports, 2001-2014.
Pearson correlation outputs: Passengers and revenues (.824, p .000); Passengers and costs (.545, p .044).
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Table 10 Correlation between passengers and revenues and costs at selected airports between 2001 to 2014.
Revenues Costs
Total Aeronautical Commercial Total
Airport Coefficient P Coefficient P Coefficient P Coefficient P
East Midlands .905** .000 .049 .868 .708** .005 .535* .048
Newcastle .914** .000 .469 .091 .756** .002 .691* .006
Belfast International .832** .000 .231 .426 .881** .000 .274 .343
Liverpool .963** .000 .239 .455 .970** .000 .583** .029
Aberdeen .842** .000 .809** .000 .875** .000 .758** .002
Leeds Bradford .819** .000 -.692* .018 .945** .000 .854** .000
Southampton .809** .000 .787** .004 .717** .013 .419 .136
Cardiff .810** .000 .625* .017 .310 .280 -.372 .190
Doncaster .330 .386 -.533 .140 .022 .955 -.533 .140
Exeter .786** .001 .278 .358 .527 .064 .809 .000
Bournemouth .622* .018 .307 .286 .604* .022 .458 .100
Humberside .160 .585 .557* .039 -.045 .877 -.139 .637
Blackpool .572 .052 .751** .005 -.345 .273 .703* .011
Durham Tees Valley .949** .000 .949** .000 .757** .002 .551* .041
* Significant at the 0.05 level. ** Significant at the 0.01 level.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
This paper investigates the traffic and financial performance of the UK´s smaller regional 
airports from 2001 to 2014. During this time, the airports have experienced some major 
changes in their operating environment. In the early years, many of the airports experienced 
rapid growth from LCCs. During later years, traffic volumes fell dramatically and then 
stagnated at many airports, resulting in heavy and sustained losses for some.
The change in fortunes is partly a result of external factors such as the global financial crisis 
and subsequent recession in the UK, the weak pound, increasing rates of APD, tighter 
security measures at airports worldwide, and improved rail services in the UK. There have 
also been a number of one-off shock events such as the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull. These 
external factors have combined to suppress demand. However, aviation is a resilient and 
cyclical industry that will no doubt recover in coming years.
There are however two key issues to consider from the findings of this study when assessing 
future prospects for the airports. Firstly, airline strategies are evolving. Seasonal package 
holidays, which have traditionally been a main source of traffic for smaller regional airports 
in the UK, are still important. However, leisure carriers are increasingly switching from 
charter to scheduled seat sales, and to larger regional airports where there is greater potential 
for demand. The trend for switching to larger regional and in some cases London airports is 
also growing amongst LCCs. Increased unit fleet size and longer average sector length of 
carriers in general further emphasises the need for them to switch to larger airports where 
there is greater potential for demand and the possibility of feeding traffic onto longer-haul 
services, but also where infrastructure such as runways are capable of handling their aircraft. 
The high concentration of airports in the UK means that the catchment areas of many 
regional airports overlap anyway.
Secondly, is the lack of available capacity at London´s main airports. Small regional airports 
are often considered as being vital for their regional economies due to the connectivity that 
they provide. However, without access to the UK´s main cities, or to global connections from 
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the UK´s long-haul airports, the benefits of such airports are somewhat reduced, and 
opportunities for air service development may be limited (e.g. to niche regional operations, 
business aviation, cargo, or outbound leisure routes). Delayed decisions over expanding 
airport capacity in London, and a limited regulatory framework for ring-fencing slots for 
regional services from such airports means that the problems regarding access to London 
from the regions will continue to grow. In addition, regional and mainline carriers fortunate 
to have slots at the main London airports may be more likely to use them for European and 
long-haul rather than domestic services anyway. 
Changing airline strategies and the concentration of traffic at larger regional and London 
airports limits future prospects for the UK´s smaller regional airports. The larger ones 
(serving 3-5 mppa) will be seeking to recover and grow the traffic that they lost in recent 
years including possible long-haul services. However, the smaller ones (especially those 
serving less than 1 mppa) are in a precarious situation. They are likely to experience 
significant downward pressure on aeronautical revenues as they seek to develop potentially 
non-viable air services, the low traffic volumes affect their ability to generate commercial 
revenues, and their high fixed costs are not so affected by changes in traffic volume anyway. 
Some of them appear to be inherently loss making and in addition to seeking to develop air 
services, may need to diversity their business in order to survive (e.g. by using airport land 
for maintenance facilities or commercial non-aviation purposes). In fact, this a key message 
contained in the EC’s State aid rules for all EU airports, which remains relevant to UK 
airports even when the implications of leaving the EU are currently unclear. Specifically 
within this the UK Regional Air Connectivity Fund that was introduced in 2016 offers a 
timely lifeline to airports with less than 5 mppa by offering start-up aid of up to £7 million to 
support routes that are not currently commercially viable but may be so if given time to build 
passenger numbers. Applications in 2016 that involve airports from this study include: Leeds 
Bradford with a Flybe service from Newquay, Exeter with a Flybe service from Norwich, 
Newcastle with a Linksair service from Norwich, and Southampton with Flybe services to 
Lyon and Munich.
Without a significant change in fortunes, private investors involved in smaller loss-making 
airports may look to secondary sales, as has been the case in recent years with some of the 
larger airports in this study. Alternatively, they may be handed back to the government, as 
has been the case with Cardiff, or close. Some of the larger airports in this study have smaller 
neighbours nearby, and may therefore benefit significantly from any closures.
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